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WHAT IT TAKES: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ARKANSAS
SUPREME COURT’S PETITION FOR REVIEW PROCESS

Justice Rhonda Wood, Jessica Finan Patterson, and Brian W.
Johnston*
Much of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s docket involves whether to
grant petitions for review from decisions of the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
From January 1, 2015, through July 1, 2021, the supreme court considered
petitions for review in 772 cases. The supreme court granted review in just
92 cases, or 11.92%. This Article is a statistical analysis of those 772 cases
as they relate to the petition for review process and outcome at the supreme
court.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a general procedural
overview of the appellate process in Arkansas and the jurisdiction of both
appellate courts. Part II explains the methodology we used to obtain the data
for this Article. Part III is the statistical analysis itself. And in Part IV, we
analyze the granted petitions by case type and draw conclusions.
Our data and analysis show some predictability in which cases the supreme court granted review and in the supreme court’s ultimate disposition.
For example, our data show that the strongest indicator that the supreme
court would grant review was if the case was decided by a court of appeals
panel of nine judges. The second most likely indicator was if the appeal was
decided by a panel of six judges.
This Article also compares the result reached at the court of appeals
with the result reached at the supreme court. One might hypothesize that the
supreme court would grant review to change the outcome. After all, why
would the supreme court accept review if the outcome would stay the same?
Our analysis revealed that the supreme court’s result differed from the court
of appeals more often than not. Almost 55% of the time the supreme court
reached a different result. But, as this Article explains, the supreme court
may grant review for reasons other than reaching a different outcome.1
One of these reasons is the supreme court’s interest in the underlying
legal issues. We separated the granted petitions into the following case
types: civil, criminal, probate, domestic, and juvenile. Was one case type
more likely to be granted than another? This inquiry produced surprising
* Justice Rhonda Wood sits on the Arkansas Supreme Court. Jessica Finan Patterson and
Brian Johnston serve as her law clerks. The authors would like to thank their administrative
assistant, Julie Feil, and the Clerk of Court’s office, specifically Linda Barkley and Kyle
Burton, for their help with this Article.
1.See infra Part III.
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results. For example, the supreme court accepted review in almost 30% of
the petitions for review filed in probate cases.2 But these were not “typical”
probate cases about will contests or estate administration; nearly all probate
cases concerned guardianships over children or adoptions. This focus on
children dovetailed with the third highest case type in which the supreme
court granted review: domestic-relations cases. These were granted at a rate
of more than 18%.3 These results, combined with our analysis in Part IV,
show the supreme court’s focus on petitions where guardianships, adoptions,
or divorces touched on the custody of children.
The supreme court also accepted review in many cases in which the
court of appeals had dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This happened most often in appeals from divorce decrees. But the trend showed up
in civil, probate, and juvenile cases, too. The supreme court showed a preference to reach the merits in these cases. In some, the supreme court would
remand the case to the court of appeals for further consideration. In others,
the supreme court would keep the case and decide the merits on its own.
We hope this Article will illuminate the petition for review process for
practitioners. We know of no other descriptive study of the supreme court’s
petition for review docket. And we hope the results can help lawyers as they
advise their clients and make informed decisions about whether to seek review at the supreme court.
I. PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
A.

Where Do Appeals Go?

We start by summarizing appellate jurisdiction in Arkansas. Under the
Arkansas Constitution, the supreme court has “[s]tatewide appellate jurisdiction[,]”4 and the court of appeals “shall have such appellate jurisdiction as
the Supreme Court shall by rule determine[.]”5 Under the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, all appeals must be filed with
the court of appeals unless original appellate jurisdiction lies with the supreme court.6 Broadly, the supreme court exercises original appellate jurisdiction over the following: (1) construction or interpretation of the Arkansas
Constitution; (2) criminal appeals in which the sentence is life imprisonment
or death; (3) extraordinary writs; (4) election cases; (5) attorney discipline;

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 2(D)(1).
Id. § 5.
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a).
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(6) judicial discipline; (7) subsequent appeals to the supreme court; and (8)
appeals the law requires the supreme court to hear.7
The supreme court has also chosen to exercise jurisdiction in interlocutory appeals involving class-action certification orders under Rule 23 of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.8 Previously, the supreme court also exercised jurisdiction in all appeals involving ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims arising under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1.9 But now,
the supreme court hears in the first instance Rule 37 cases only when the
underlying sentence was life imprisonment or death.10
The supreme court can also decide an appeal in the first instance, even
if the case was first lodged in the court of appeals.11 Three methods exist for
transferring an appeal from the court of appeals to the supreme court.12 First,
a party can file a motion requesting reassignment.13 Second, the supreme
court can reassign the case on its own initiative14 after considering a nonexhaustive list of factors, which includes issues concerning: (1) first impression; (2) inconsistency between an opinion of the court of appeals and supreme court; (3) the United States Constitution; (4) substantial public interest; (5) clarification or development of law; and (6) substantial questions of
statutory interpretation.15 This list is not limited, and the supreme court can
consider any other factor when deciding to transfer.16
Third, the court of appeals can certify a case to the supreme court.17 In
so doing, the court of appeals must identify why the case falls outside its
jurisdiction or why the case raises one or more issues of significant public
interest or major legal interest.18 When the court of appeals certifies a case to
the supreme court, the court of appeals submits a certification memo to the
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Koppers, Inc. v. Trotter, 2020 Ark. 354, 2020 WL 6375918; Mun. Health
Benefit Fund v. Hendrix, 2020 Ark. 235, 602 S.W.3d 101; City of Conway v. Shumate, 2017
Ark. 36, 511 S.W.3d 319. The court of appeals may hear a class-action appeal after a final
merits disposition. E.g., Gen-Kal Pipe & Steel Corp. v. M.S. Wholesale Plumbing, Inc., 2019
Ark. App. 117, at 2, 573 S.W.3d 1, 2 (affirming a summary judgment case in which a class
action was certified). But we found no cases in which the court of appeals heard, on an interlocutory basis, an appeal from a class certification order.
9. Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1.
10. Id.; see also Bridgeman v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 3–4, 525 S.W.3d 459, 462
(explaining transfer of jurisdiction).
11. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(c).
12. Id. 1-2(b)–(c).
13. See, e.g., Order, Flywheel Energy Prod., LLC v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, No. CV21-136 (Ark. July 22, 2021) (order denying appellant’s motion to certify to supreme court).
14. See, e.g., Trammell v. Wright, 2016 Ark. 147, at 1, 489 S.W.3d 636, 637.
15. ARK. S. CT. R. 1-2(b).
16. Id.
17. Id. 1-2(c).
18. Id.
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supreme court outlining the reason for certification.19 The entire supreme
court then votes on the certification memo as a motion.20 If the supreme
court accepts certification, it decides the merits of the appeal.21 If the supreme court votes to deny certification, then the appeal remains with the
court of appeals.22 The supreme court can also accept a specific certified
question, answer it, then remand the case to the court of appeals for a decision on the merits.23
Unless the case is transferred to the supreme court as described above,
the court of appeals will decide the appeal first. Here’s how that generally
works. The court of appeals is composed of twelve judges elected from seven districts.24 The court of appeals’ internal rules provide that the judges sit
in four separate divisions of three judges each.25 The Clerk of the Courts’
office uses a computer program to randomly assign judges to divisions.26
The divisions are enumerated as Division I,27 Division II,28 Division III,29
and Division IV.30 The computer then randomly assigns cases to one of the
four divisions (panels). The court of appeals’ internal rules require a unanimous decision within a three-judge panel.31 If the three-judge panel does not
agree on a case’s disposition, then it is submitted to an expanded six-judge
panel.32 The six-judge panel consists of the original division and the next
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Order, Beard v. State of Arkansas, No. CR-21-85 (Ark. Nov. 4, 2021)
(order granting certification to supreme court).
21. E.g., Turnbo v. State, 2021 Ark. 166, at 1, 629 S.W.3d. 797; Macklin v. Ark. Dep’t
of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. 151, at 1, 624 S.W.3d 869, 870; Agrifund, LLC v. Regions Bank,
2020 Ark. 246, at 5, 602 S.W.3d 726, 730.
22. E.g., Order, St. Francis River Reg’l Water Dist. v. City of Marmaduke, No. CV-19595 (Ark. May 20, 2021) (order denying certification to supreme court); see also St. Francis
River Reg’l Water Dist. v. City of Marmaduke, 2021 Ark. App. 305, 626 S.W.3d 168 (subsequent opinion from the court of appeals).
23. E.g., Pulaski Choice, L.L.C. v. 2735 Villa Creek, L.P., 2010 Ark. 91, at 7, 362
S.W.3d 882, 886 (answering a certified question about statutory interpretation and remanding
remaining issues to court of appeals); Bales v. City of Fort Smith, 2017 Ark. 161, at 4, 518
S.W.3d 76, 79 (answering a certified question about jurisdiction and remanding to court of
appeals); Minor v. Chase Auto Fin. Corp., 2010 Ark. 246, at 13, 372 S.W.3d 762, 769 (answering a certified question about contract interpretation and remanding to court of appeals).
24. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-12-202 (current through 2021).
25. Judge Josephine Linker Hart & Guilford M. Dudley, The Unpublished Rules of the
Arkansas Court of Appeals: The Internal Rules and Procedures of the Arkansas Court of
Appeals, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 109, 114 (2011).
26. The Authors have verified this process with the Clerk of Court’s office.
27. See, e.g., Williams v. Davis, 2021 Ark. App. 199, 625 S.W.3d 243.
28. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 98, 618 S.W.3d 207.
29. See, e.g., Hurd v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 180, 2021 WL 1557902.
30. See, e.g., Neff v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 123, 618 S.W.3d 479.
31. Hart & Dudley, supra note 25, at 114.
32. Id.
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enumerated division.33 For example, if an appeal is assigned to Division III,
but the three judges on that panel are not unanimous in the disposition, then
the case will be decided by both Division III and Division IV, sitting as a
six-judge panel.34 If the six-judge panel does not reach a majority vote as to
the case’s disposition, then the case is submitted to a panel of nine judges,
that is, three divisions.35 As before, the next enumerated division is added to
the prior two divisions. In our example, Division I would be added to Divisions III and IV. One cannot assume that a nine-judge panel will always lead
to a 5-4 majority decision.36 Results may be unexpected.
While there is no right of appeal to the supreme court from a decision
of the court of appeals, court rules provide a procedure whereby parties may
seek discretionary review with the supreme court following a court of appeals’ decision.37 That is, after the court of appeals issues its decision and
the parties have had an opportunity to petition for rehearing, the parties may
seek supreme court review by filing a petition for review. The deadline to
file the petition for review is ten calendar days from the end of the court of
appeals’ rehearing period.38 The rehearing period ends when the court of
appeals decides the last pending petition for rehearing or, if no rehearing
petition is filed, eighteen calendar days from the date of the court of appeals’ decision, whichever is later.39 If a petition for review is not filed within the deadline, the clerk will issue the mandate, and the court-of-appeals’
decision becomes final.40
Should a party decide to file a petition for review, the petition must
state the grounds for review.41 An appropriate ground is (1) a split decision
by the court of appeals; (2) the court of appeals’ opinion conflicts with its
33. Id. The Clerk of Courts assigns all Public Service Commission appeals to two divisions in the first instance. Id. Significant time has passed since the referenced law review
article and some of the internal rules have changed. One of the authors, Justice Wood, was a
member of the court of appeals during some of the changes.
34. E.g., Galli v. Jones, 2021 Ark. App. 302, at 1, 627 S.W.3d 434, 435 (affirming by
vote of 5-1).
35. E.g., J.M.E. v. Valley View Agri Sys., 2016 Ark. App. 531, at 1, 505 S.W.3d 211,
212 (reversing on a 5-4 vote).
36. In Harley v. Dempster, a nine-judge panel did not reach a majority opinion. 2017
Ark. App. 159, at 1, 512 S.W.3d 698, 699 (four judges reversed and remanded, two dissenters
would have affirmed, and three dissenters would have dismissed the appeal). The supreme
court granted review and dismissed the appeal because the briefs were filed untimely. See
Harley v. Dempster, 2018 Ark. 43, at 3.
37. See ARK. S. CT. R. 1-2(d).
38. Id. 2-4(a).
39. Id. See also id. 2-3(a). These deadlines do not apply to dependency-neglect cases.
The deadlines to petition for rehearing and review in those cases can be found at Ark. S. Ct.
R. 6-9(k)(2).
40. Id. 5-3(a).
41. ARK. S. CT. R. 2-3(f).
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own or supreme court precedent; or (3) the case errs on any reassignment
factor listed in Rule 1-2(b).42 The Rule 1-2(b) factors are broad. Thus, a party has considerable leeway to make a good-faith argument for review. The
opposing party has ten days to respond to the petition for review.43 No provision exists for the filing of amicus briefs in petitions for review.44
After a party petitions for review and after any responses are filed, the
supreme court decides whether to grant the petition. The supreme court issues decisions on pending petitions for review monthly and lists those decisions on the supreme court’s syllabus. When deciding whether to grant a
petition, the supreme court can consider the court of appeals’ majority opinion, any dissents and concurrences, any petition for rehearing and responses,
and the petition for review and responses.45 The petition for review is limited to three pages, so filing a petition for rehearing, which allows ten pages,
and attaching it to the petition for review is a common method for expanding the arguments presented to the supreme court.46
The Arkansas Constitution requires four justices to decide a case.47
Thus, even if one justice does not participate in the decision to grant or deny
the petition, four justices out of the remaining six must vote to grant.48 Contrast this procedure with that of writs of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, when review is granted based on a minority vote of four out of
nine.49
B. What Happens When the Supreme Court Grants a Petition for Review?
Once the supreme court grants a petition for review, the parties’ original briefs are automatically resubmitted to the supreme court.50 The parties
can file supplemental briefs and request oral argument.51 Upon accepting a
petition for review, the supreme court considers the appeal as if it had been
originally filed in its court.52 In other words, it does not review the court of
42. See also id. 2-4(d).
43. Id. 2-4(e).
44. Id. 4-6.
45. See generally id. 2-4(d).
46. ARK. S. CT. R. 2-4(c); id. 2-4(e); id. 2-3(e).
47. ARK. CONST. amend. 80 § 2(C).
48. See id.
49. STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 5.4, at 325 (10th ed.
2013).
50. The supreme court changed this July 1, 2019. Previously the parties had to refile
their prior briefs within ten days of the supreme court granting review and had to seek permission to file supplemental briefs. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4 (e) (amended July 1, 2019). This
change streamlined the process.
51. ARK. S. CT. R. 2-4(f)–(g).
52. See Symanietz v. Symanietz, 2021 Ark. 75, at 4, 620 S.W.3d 518, 523.
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appeals’ decision.53 Instead, the supreme court reviews the circuit court’s or
administrative agency’s decision.54
Once the supreme court has accepted a petition for review, a few dispositions can follow. The first option is to decide the appeal on the merits.55
But the supreme court has other options too. For example, the supreme court
may decide to limit its review to a threshold jurisdictional issue and remand
the remaining issues to the court of appeals.56 Typically, this occurs when a
court of appeals’ decision concerns a procedural issue, and the supreme
court reaches a different decision from the court of appeals on that threshold
issue.57
Another dispositional path is for the supreme court to dismiss a petition
for review as improvidently granted.58 This occurs because the supreme
court, after submission and briefing, decides review is unwarranted. Again,
because the petition for review itself is limited, it sometimes takes supplemental briefing for the supreme court to determine that a full review was
unnecessary and will only delay finality. For example, in Crenshaw v.
Mcfalls, the supreme court granted review based on the petitioners’ allegation that the court of appeals’ decision conflicted with prior holdings of the
supreme court.59 But, upon examination of the case, the supreme court determined that “no conflict exists and that the petition was improvidently
granted.”60 When the supreme court holds that review was improvidently
granted, the decision of the court of appeals stands.61 So even if the supreme
court grants a petition for review, it may not ultimately decide the merits of
the appeal.
II. METHODOLOGY
With this background in mind, we turn to the purpose of this Article.
This Article analyzes all petitions for review considered by the Arkansas
53. E.g., Ark. Dep’t. Hum. Servs. v. Mitchell, 2021 Ark. 187, at 5, 2021 WL 4927547,
at *2 (explaining the supreme court’s review process when it accepts a petition for review in
an administrative appeal).
54. Id.
55. E.g., Conagra, Inc. v. Strother, 340 Ark. 672, at 676, 13 S.W.3d 150, 152 (2000)
(granting petition for review and affirming the merits of the circuit court’s denial of the motion for new trial).
56. See, e.g., Havner v. Ne. Ark. Elec. Coop., 2016 Ark. 382, 2016 WL 6649148 (vacating and remanding to the court of appeals when a rule change altered the outcome).
57. See, e.g., id.
58. E.g., Crenshaw v. McFalls, 2016 Ark. 39, at 2, 2016 WL 448019, at *1; McFalls v.
Crenshaw, 2016 Ark. 32, at 2, 2016 WL 448759, at *1 (both dismissing petitions for review
as improvidently granted).
59. Crenshaw, 2016 Ark. 39, at 2, 2016 WL 448019, at *1.
60. Id.
61. See id.
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Supreme Court in recent years to determine whether predictable trends exist.
We relied on data from the Arkansas Administrative Office of the Court’s
case-management system, CourtConnect. CourtConnect provides public
access to Arkansas state court information.62 It allows users, like us, to
search case filings. Data are only as good as the user’s input. But we have
high confidence in these data. The Clerk of Courts supervises a small and
well-trained staff who continually maintain this information.
For this project, we first generated a report by performing docket
searches for petitions for review granted (docket code ACO69) and petitions
for review denied (docket code ACO36) from January 1, 2015, through July
1, 2021.63 These reports provided us with the case identification number,
case filing date, case description (title), and case type. We chose this period
because a majority of the current supreme court (Justices Baker, Hudson,
Wood, and Wynne) served during that entire period.64
In recent years, the case-management system has undergone changes.
Until 2019, when a case was filed with the court of appeals, the clerk assigned it a case number. If a party later petitioned for review, the clerk assigned it a different case number. This resulted in cases having two different
appellate case number designations—one for the court-of-appeals case and
one for the supreme court case.65
In 2019, the supreme court approved a unified, numerical casenumbering system. Under this system, the clerk assigns each appellate case
one numerical designation, which the case retains even if transferred between the two appellate courts. But because some cases from 2015 through
2018 had two case numbers, some petitions for review appeared in duplicate
in our original dataset generated by CourtConnect. We culled those duplicate case numbers before conducting our analysis.
We also culled duplicate petitions for review filed in a single case. In
other words, we counted by case, not by total number of petitions for review
62. See ARK. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE COURTS, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY
26–27 (2020), https://www.arcourts.gov/sites/default/files/AnnualReport2020.pdf.
63. Our dataset excludes cases the supreme court granted review for during this time
period but did not issue a written opinion until after July 1, 2021. Given that parameter, we
excluded two cases from our study. See Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Crimes Against Child.
Div. v. Mitchell, 2021 Ark. 187; Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Crimes Against Child. Div. v.
Mitchell, 2021 Ark. 188.
64. Supreme Court Justices, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://www.arcourts.gov/courts/supremecourt/justices (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
65. Compare Whalen v. State, 2016 Ark. 343, 500 S.W.3d 710 (assigned case number
CR-15-1067), and Whalen v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 706, 478 S.W.3d 249 (assigned case
number CR-14-980 on petition for review), with Howton v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 86, 619
S.W.3d 29 (assigned case number CR-20-432), and Order, Howton v. State, No. CR-20-432
(Ark. Apr. 15, 2021) (supreme court order denying petition for review within the same case
number).
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filed. For example, in some cases, a party petitioned for review, but the petition became moot when the court of appeals granted a petition for rehearing.
After rehearing by the court of appeals, a second petition for review was
filed. In these cases, we counted only one petition for review and excluded
the moot petition for review.
Also, multiple parties have filed petitions for review within the same
case. But we counted these multiple petitions as a single petition. For example, if the appellant and appellee both filed petitions for review, we counted
this as one petition for review.66 Thus, the data included only the number of
cases in which a petition for review was filed, not the aggregate number of
petitions for review filed. We did this because when the supreme court
grants a petition for review, it reviews the entire case, not just the issue
raised in the petition.67
We then categorized each appeal into one of eight case-type categories:
civil, criminal, juvenile, probate, domestic relations, department of workforce services, workers’ compensation, and public service commission. Five
of these categories correspond with the designation the case received when
it was first filed in circuit court: domestic relations, probate, juvenile, civil,
and criminal. These “subject-matter divisions” are administrative only and
do not affect a circuit court’s jurisdiction.68 “Domestic relations cases” are
defined by Administrative Order Number 14 as “cases relating to divorce,
annulment, maintenance, custody, visitation, support, paternity, and domestic abuse.”69 Probate cases are defined by the Order as “cases relating to
decedent estate administration, trust administration, adoption, guardianship,
conservatorship, commitment, and adult protective custody.”70 The Order
does not define juvenile cases, but these essentially fall under three categories: juvenile delinquency, dependency-neglect, and family-in-need-ofservices.71 Criminal cases are those actions filed by the prosecuting attorney
alleging the violation of the Arkansas Criminal Code.72 Civil cases encom-

66. See, e.g., Order, Kellensworth v. State, No. CR-19-684 (Ark. Sept. 24, 2020) (granting appellee’s petition for review but denying appellant’s petition for review).
67. See Symanietz v. Symanietz, 2021 Ark. 75, at 4, 620 S.W.3d 518, 523 (explaining
that the supreme court treats appeals granted on petition for review as if they had been filed
there first).
68. Edwards v. Nelson, 372 Ark. 300, 303, 275 S.W.3d 158, 161 (2008).
69. Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 14(b) (amended 2012).
70. Id.
71. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-306(a)(1), (a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(D) (1987).
72. “The Arkansas Constitution provides that the duty of charging an accused with a
felony is reserved to the grand jury or to the prosecutor.” State v. Knight, 318 Ark. 158, at
162, 884 S.W.2d 258, 260 (1994). ARK. R. CRIM. P. 1.5 (providing that any criminal prosecution must be brought in the name of the State of Arkansas); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 1681-104(a)(3)(A) (1987).
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pass any other matter filed in circuit court not covered by the foregoing categories.
Three other classes of cases involve administrative appeals filed directly in the court of appeals: Workers’ Compensation Commission; employment-security division; and Public Service Commission. Disability claims
under the Workers’ Compensation Act must be filed directly with the Workers’ Compensation Commission.73 Any appeals from the Workers’ Compensation Commission go directly to the court of appeals.74 The same is true for
appeals from a denial of unemployment benefits or appeals from the Public
Service Commission: a party must first proceed through the agency’s review
process, and any appeal goes directly to the court of appeals.75 In contrast,
under the Administrative Procedures Act, a party can appeal an agency adjudication or rule-making decision by other state agencies directly to the
circuit court.76
Additionally, for our purposes, we included any petitions for review
granted that the supreme court later dismissed as improvidently granted.77
Because the supreme court granted review and wrote an opinion in those
cases, we counted them as granted even though the supreme court later dismissed the petition for review.
The reports generated by CourtConnect, while a great starting point for
identifying cases where the supreme court granted review, lacked some critical details we needed for our analysis. To obtain more detailed information,
we individually reviewed each case.78 Using CourtConnect and Westlaw, we
recorded the court of appeals citation, court of appeals’ decision, the number
of judges in the court of appeals panel, court of appeals’ opinion citation, the
decision of the supreme court, and the supreme court opinion citation.79
From there we determined whether the supreme court reached the same or a
different result from the court of appeals. When making this determination,
we labeled any supreme court decision as different if it differed at all from
the court of appeals. So, for example, if the court of appeals affirmed and
the supreme court reversed in part and remanded in part, we labeled the result as different. And, of course, even if the supreme court reached the same
result as the court of appeals, the supreme court may have changed the rea73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-702(a)(1) (1987).
74. Id. § 11-9-711(b)(1).
75. Id. § 11-10-529(a)(1)(A) (unemployment-benefit claims); id. § 23-2-423(a)(1)
(1987) (Public Service Commission orders).
76. Id. § 25-15-212(a)–(b) (1987) (agency adjudications); id. § 25-15-214 (1987) (agency’s failure to act in any case of rulemaking or adjudication).
77. See cases cited supra note 58.
78. Margaret Whisenhunt, a college-student intern, was critical to this step. She performed countless hours of research and statistical analysis without which this Article would
not have been possible.
79. All of this information is included in the appendix attached to the end of this Article.
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soning from that of the court of appeals. Parsing those types of differences
required more careful legal analysis, and we have done that in Part IV below.
III. RESULTS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
After classifying the petitions for review as described above, we performed a descriptive statistical analysis. We focused on the following data
points: the number of petitions for review submitted to the supreme court,
the number of petitions for review granted, and the case-type category
breakdown. We also considered whether the case type and the number of
judges on the panel at the court of appeals impacted the supreme court’s
decision to grant review and, if granted, whether the result was the same or
different from the court of appeals. The results showed that the supreme
court denied most petitions for review filed. During the relevant period, the
supreme court granted only 92 out of 772 petitions for review filed, or at a
rate of 11.92%.
The most predictive data point on whether the supreme court would
grant review was the number of judges on the court of appeals panel. Decisions from three-judge panels were granted review 8.5% of the time. This is
low, but the rate increased if more judges decided the case. Decisions from
six-judge panels were granted review 33.8% of the time. And the most predictive data point of all: decisions from nine-judge panels were granted review 63.6% of the time. The only other data point that showed the supreme
court would grant review nearly that high was if the case type was probate.
Those cases were granted at a rate of 29.41%.
Once the supreme court granted review, it reached a different disposition from the court of appeals in about 55% of the cases. The data showed a
differentiation between case type and whether the supreme court reached a
different outcome: the supreme court’s disposition differed most often in
domestic cases and workers’ compensation cases. The supreme court
reached a different outcome in 64.7% of domestic cases and in 62.5% of
workers’ compensation cases.
A.

Total Cases Considered on Petition for Review

We first examined the total number of petitions for review filed by
case-type. From January 1, 2015 through July 1, 2021, the supreme court
considered petitions for review in 772 cases. Most of the petitions for review, 282 in total, were filed in civil cases, which made up 36.5% of the
total cases. Criminal cases constituted the second most common type of petitions for review, with 213 in total, or 27.6%. Ninety-three petitions, or
12%, were filed in domestic-relations cases. Seventy-one petitions, 9.2%,
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were filed in juvenile cases. Less often, petitions for review were filed in
probate (4.4%), department-of-workforce-services (4.4%), and workers’
compensation (5.5%) cases. Only two petitions (.3%) were filed in publicservice-commission cases. Chart 1 below shows this statistical breakdown.
Chart 1: Total Petitions for Review Filed by Case Type

Civil
Criminal
Juvenile
Probate
Domestic
Dept Workforce Service
Workers’ Compensation
Public Service Commission
Total

B.

Frequency
282
213
71
34
93
34
43
2
772

Percent
36.5
27.6
9.2
4.4
12.0
4.4
5.5
0.3

Granted Petitions for Review by Case Type

Next, we analyzed the number of cases in which the supreme court
granted review and categorized the granted petitions by case type. All told,
the supreme court granted petitions for review in 11.92% of cases, or 92
total cases. This means in the vast majority of cases, or almost 90% of the
time, the supreme court denied the petition for review.
Chart 2: Total Petitions for Review Granted by Case Type

Civil
Criminal
Juvenile
Probate
Domestic
Dept Workforce Service
Workers’ Compensation
Total

Frequency
27
19
9
10
17
1
9
92

Percent
29.3
20.6
9.8
10.9
18.5
1.1
9.8
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In what case-type did the supreme court most often grant the petition
for review? Civil cases and criminal cases. This is no surprise because these
categories constituted the most petitions for review filed. On the other hand,
some case types had a higher grant rate than filed rate. For example, while
domestic relations made up only 12% of the petitions for review filed, this
case type constituted 18.5% of the petitions for review granted. Similarly,
although probate cases made up only 4% of the petitions filed, those cases
constituted 11.4% of the total petitions for review granted. In other words,
the supreme granted petitions for review in these two case types at a disproportionate rate.
This leads to the data which show the case type where the supreme
court granted review at the highest statistical rate. Chart 3 shows this breakdown.
Chart 3: Percent Granted Within Case Type
Case Type

Total Filed

Total Granted

Percent

Civil

282

27

9.57

Criminal

213

19

8.92

Juvenile

71

9

12.68

Probate

34

10

29.41

Domestic

93

17

18.28

Dept Workforce Service

34

1

2.94

Workers’ Compensation

43

9

20.93

Public Service Commission

2

0

0.00

Total

772

92

11.92

Probate cases were the easy winner: the supreme court granted probate
petitions for review at a rate of 29.41%. The next highest percentages were
workers’ compensation and domestic cases. Petitions for review filed in
workers’ compensation cases were granted at a rate of 20.93%. And petitions for review in domestic cases were granted at a rate of 18.28%. The
lowest statistical percentage of petitions for review were granted in juvenile
cases (12.68%), civil cases (9.57%), and criminal cases (8.92%). Last, petitions for review in department-of-workforce-services cases were granted at
the lowest rate: only 2.94%. As mentioned above, no petitions for review
were granted in public-service-commission cases, but only two petitions
were filed.
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Number of Judges on the Court of Appeals Panel

We also collected statistics on the number of judges who sat on the
panel at the court of appeals. Ultimately, this was the strongest indicator
whether the supreme court would grant a petition for review. The more
judges who decided the case, the more likely the supreme court granted the
petition for review. Chart 4 shows the results:80
Chart 4: Petitions for Review Grant/Deny Percentages by number of judges on court of appeals panel
3-judge
6-judge
9-judge
Total
panel
panel
panel
Grant

92

56

22

14

Deny

655

604

43

8

8.5%

33.8%

63.6%

Percentage of Petitions
Granted

Petitions from decisions by three-judge panels were granted at a rate of
8.5%. Petitions from decisions by six-judge panels were granted at a rate of
33.8%. And petitions from decisions by nine-judge panels were granted at a
rate of 63.6%. The strongest indicator that the supreme court would grant
review, by a wide margin, was when a nine-judge court of appeals panel had
decided the case. The second strongest metric was when a six-judge court of
appeals panel decided a case. As explained in Part IV, when the court of
appeals was split or when a dissenting judge highlighted an issue needing
the supreme court’s attention, the supreme court was also more likely to
grant review.
D.

Court of Appeals Result Compared to Supreme Court Result and by
Case Type

Our last data set was whether the supreme court reached a different
disposition from the court of appeals.81 If the supreme court granted review,
80. The total number of denied petitions excludes twenty-five cases in which the court
of appeals issued a per curiam or disposed of the matter by docket entry. In those cases, we
did not know whether the decision was reached by a three-, six-, or nine-judge panel because
the decision did not come from an authored opinion.
81. For the purposes of determining whether the disposition was the same or different,
the universe of cases is 87 rather than 92. In five of the petitions for review granted, the supreme court dismissed or otherwise disposed of the appeal before it reached a decision.
Therefore, in these cases, the supreme court could not have reached either the same or different disposition from the court of appeals because it made no merits decision at all. See Order,
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was it more or less likely to reach a different result? To answer this question, we analyzed and compared the court of appeals’ disposition with the
supreme court’s disposition.
One might assume that if the supreme court granted review, then it
would reach a different disposition from the court of appeals. And the results bear that out. Chart 5 shows that in cases where the supreme court
granted review, it reached a different result from the court of appeals 55% of
the time. On the other hand, the supreme court reached the same result about
45% of the time. Thus, if a petitioner lost her case at the court of appeals
and the supreme court granted review, it was more likely than not that the
supreme court would grant her a different outcome.
Chart 5: Comparison of Case Result of Supreme Court
Frequency
39
48
87

Same
Different
Total

Percent
44.8
55.2
100.0

We also analyzed whether the supreme court reached a different disposition from the court of appeals based on case type. Chart 6 shows these
results.
Chart 6: Comparison of Case Result of All Granted Petitions
for Review by Case Type
Civil

Criminal

Juvenile

Probate

Domestic

Dept.
Workforce
Service

Workers’
Compensation

Total

Same
Result

10

9

5

5

6

1

3

39

Different
Result

13

10

4

5

11

0

5

48

Total

23

19

9

10

17

1

8

87

56.5%

52.6%

44.4%

50%

64.7%

0%

62.5%

55.2%

Percent
Different

Cantrell v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. CV-18-502 (Ark. Sept. 5, 2019) (order granting joint
motion to dismiss); Harley v. Dempster, 2018 Ark. 43 (dismissing for failure to timely file
brief); Holden v. Waggoner, 2017 Ark. 4, at 1 (remanding to Workers’ Compensation Commission after parties filed joint motion to withdraw petition for review); Order, United Sys. of
Ark. v. Beason, No. CV-149-12 (Ark. Apr. 16, 2015) (order granting joint motion to dismiss); Order, Stephens Prod. Co. v. Bennett, No. CV-15-935 (Ark. July 21, 2015) (order
granting joint motion to dismiss).

506

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

In criminal, juvenile, and probate cases, the supreme court reached the
same disposition about 50% of the time. Yet, in civil and domestic cases, the
supreme court was likely to reach a different outcome. In domestic-relations
cases, the supreme court reached a different result in almost two-thirds of
the cases. Workers’ compensation appeals also showed a larger variance
between the result at the court of appeals versus the supreme court—the
supreme court reached a different result in over 60% of those cases.
IV. CASE TYPE ANALYSIS
The data we collected in Part III tell only part of the story. To best understand why the supreme court may have granted review in a case, we also
analyzed the opinions from the court of appeals and the supreme court to see
if any trends emerged. To do this, we divided the cases into the most common case types: civil, criminal, juvenile, probate, and domestic relations.82
Below, we discuss some common themes within these five case types. We
also discuss whether the supreme court’s disposition vis-à-vis the court of
appeals could illuminate the issues that attracted the supreme court’s interest. Practitioners should find this section useful because it could help them
frame an issue to the supreme court. This section could also give insight into
what the supreme court has focused on in the past, thus helping practitioners
make decisions on the utility of petitioning for review.
Several trends emerged following our review. Many reinforce the data
we collected in Part III. We identified several cases when a split at the court
of appeals led to the supreme court granting review. We also identified cases
where a court of appeals judge highlighted an issue for supreme court review. The trends also dovetailed with the supreme court’s factors for granting review under Rule 2-4(d). Several cases contained an issue of first impression or an issue of substantial public interest. And many also contained
constitutional questions. Last, the supreme court granted review in an inordinate number of cases where the court of appeals dismissed an appeal on a
procedural ground. In some of those cases, the supreme court found no procedural basis to dismiss and instead reached the merits of the appeal. This
trend occurred throughout every case type, excluding criminal, which generally are not subject to strict procedural restrictions to perfect an appeal.83

82. We excluded workers’ compensation cases due to the highly specialized nature of
that practice area.
83. For example, the court will still hear a late filed appeal from a criminal conviction if
an affidavit is filed showing “good cause.” ARK. R. APP. P.–CRIM. 2(e) (last amended 2021).
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Civil Cases

The supreme court granted review in twenty-four civil cases, representing 9.41% of the total petitions for review filed within this case type. Two of
those petitions were later dismissed as improvidently granted,84 and one case
was voluntarily dismissed by the parties after settlement.85 The civil cases
represent the highest percentage of cases granted (29.3%). But they also
have the widest array of legal issues. For that reason, it is hard to draw
strong conclusions across the civil cases. Instead, we have roughly divided
the civil cases into the following groups: civil procedure, tort, jury-trial
waiver and arbitration, immunity, trusts, and contracts. These groupings
highlight trends when the supreme court granted review.
1.

Civil Procedure

Five of the granted cases dealt with procedural issues,86 and two of
those five considered the finality of the circuit court’s order.87 The first is a
good example of when the court of appeals’ decision is constrained by certain procedural rules and precedent. But unlike the court of appeals, the supreme court has rule-making authority and can modify rules to conform to
existing practice.
The Havner v. Northeast Arkansas Electric Cooperative case required
the court of appeals to decide whether a judgment marked “presented” and
“recorded” by a circuit clerk was a final, appealable order. 88 The court of
appeals concluded it was not final and dismissed the appeal “because the
judgment and 54(b) certificate was recorded but never filed, . . . [so] appellant has failed to appeal from a final order.”89 The problem in the circuitcourt clerk’s office stemmed from default marks generated by software programs that failed to change the marks from “recorded” to “filed” as required
by Administrative Order 2.90
84. Crenshaw v. McFalls, 2016 Ark. 39, at 2; McFalls v. Crenshaw, 2016 Ark. 32, at 2.
We categorized these cases as if the supreme court reached the same decision as the court of
appeals.
85. See Order, Cantrell v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. CV-18-502 (Ark. Sept. 5, 2019).
86. See White v. Owen, 2021 Ark. 31, at 7, 617 S.W.3d 241, 245; Lawson v. Simmons
Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, at 10, 569 S.W.3d 865, 871; Williamson v. Baptist Med’l
Health, 2017 Ark. 92, at 3, 514 S.W.3d 445, 446; Havner v. Ne. Ark. Elec. Coop., 2016 Ark.
382, at 2, 2016 WL 6649148, at *1; Jones v. Douglas, 2016 Ark. 166, at 9, 489 S.W.3d 648,
654.
87. See Williamson, 2017 Ark. 92, at 3, 514 S.W.3d 445 at 446; Havner, 2016 Ark. 382,
at 2, 2016 WL 6649148, at *1.
88. Havner, 2016 Ark. 382, at 2, 2016 WL 6649148, at *1.
89. Id. at 2–3.
90. Id. at 3; Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(2) (amended 2018).
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The court of appeals’ opinion in Havner prompted the supreme court to
quickly revise Administrative Order 2.91 Revised Administrative Order No.
2(b)(2) stated that judgments, orders, and decrees marked “recorded” are
considered “filed.”92 Thus, when the supreme court reviewed Havner, it
concluded that the circuit-court judgment was final under the revised administrative order, and it vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and remanded to
consider the merits of the case.93
In another case, though, the supreme court found a procedural defect
when the court of appeals did not. In Williamson, a wrongful death case, the
appellant argued that her jury award omitted loss-of-life damages, creating
an inadequate monetary award. 94 The court of appeals affirmed.95 But the
supreme court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final order.96 Like it had
previously decided,97 the supreme court found that the judgment failed to
specify the dollar amount owed by the defendant and that it was ambiguous
whether the jury had apportioned fault in making its damages award. 98 Williamson represents a rare instance in which the supreme court dismissed for
lack of a final order when the court of appeals had addressed the merits.
The remaining procedural cases dealt with service of process and personal jurisdiction. In two cases, Jones v. Douglas and White v. Owen, the
supreme court reviewed service-of-process issues under the civil rules and
savings statute.99 In both cases, the supreme court modified the circuit
court’s dismissal from “with prejudice” to “without prejudice,” because the
plaintiffs had complied with the savings statute.100 In White, however, the
court of appeals had concluded that the savings statute did not apply because
the plaintiff did not make a good-faith attempt to serve the defendant at a
known address.101 The supreme court disagreed, finding that there was no
“evidence of bad faith or of a conscious disregard of knowledge” of the defendant’s correct address.102
91. In re Admin. Order No. 2(b)(2), 2016 Ark. 172 (2016).
92. Id. at 2.
93. Havner, 2016 Ark. at 3, 2016 WL 6649148, at *1.
94. Williamson v. Baptist Med. Health, 2017 Ark. 92, at 1; 547 S.W.3d at 445.
95. Williamson v. Baptist Med. Health, 2016 Ark. App. 78, at 10, 2016 WL 537280, at
*4 (rehearing denied).
96. Williamson, 2017 Ark. 92, at 1, 547 S.W.3d at 445.
97. See Ford Motor Co. v. Washington, 2013 Ark. 88, at 5–6, 2013 WL 776233, at *3.
98. Id., 2013 WL 776233, at *3.
99. White v. Owen, 2021 Ark. 31, at 14, 617 S.W.3d 241, 249; Jones v. Douglas, 2016
Ark. 166, at 1–2, 489 S.W.3d 648, 649–50; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-126 (current
through 2021).
100. White, 2021 Ark. 31, at 14, 617 S.W.3d at 249; Jones, 2016 Ark. 166, at 9–10, 489
S.W.3d at 654.
101. White v. Owen, 2020 Ark. App. 356, at 13, 609 S.W.3d 1, 8.
102. White, 2021 Ark. 31, at 13, 617 S.W.3d at 249.
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Finally, Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., which involved personal jurisdiction, presented an interesting procedural posture.103 In this tripand-fall case, the circuit court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction because minimum contacts were deficient.104 The court
of appeals reversed, applying Arkansas’ five-factor test for determining
minimum contacts over nonresident corporations.105 After the Arkansas Supreme Court denied a petition for review, the defendant corporation filed a
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.106
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the court
of appeals decision, and remanded to the court of appeals “for further consideration in light of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,
San Francisco Cty.[.]”107 In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., the United State Supreme Court rejected California’s “sliding scale” approach to personal jurisdiction, holding that for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporate defendant, there must be “an affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes
place in the forum state[.]”108
On remand, the court of appeals reconsidered its decision and affirmed,
concluding that the defendant’s contacts with Arkansas were insufficient.109
The plaintiff petitioned for review, which this time the Arkansas Supreme
Court granted.110 Although the supreme court reached the same disposition
as the court of appeals, the United States Supreme Court in Bristol-Meyers
Squibb Co. had signaled a change in its approach to personal jurisdiction.111
The Arkansas Supreme Court, therefore, used Lawson to overhaul the
State’s requirements for specific personal jurisdiction.112 The ultimate result
was an abandonment of the five-factor test.113 Like Havner discussed at the
beginning of this subsection, Lawson provides an example of the supreme

103. 2019 Ark. 84, at 1, 569 S.W.3d 865, 867.
104. Id. at 2, 569 S.W.3d at 868.
105. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 44, at 8, 511 S.W.3d 883,
889.
106. See Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Lawson, 138 S. Ct. 237 (2017).
107. Id.; see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 137
S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
108. Id. at 1780 (citing Goodyear v. Dunlap Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)).
109. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2018 Ark. App. 343, at 1, 553 S.W.3d
190, 191.
110. Lawson, 2019 Ark. 84, at 3, 569 S.W.3d at 868.
111. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
112. Lawson, 2019 Ark. 84, at 9, 569 S.W.3d 865, 871.
113. Id., 569 S.W.3d 865, 871.

510

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

court using the petition for review process to make necessary changes that
the court of appeals cannot achieve as an intermediate appellate court.114
2.

Tort

The supreme court granted review in three tort cases, with one marking
a significant shift in the law. Consistent with the supreme court’s granting
review on cases that raise issues of first impression, it reviewed Dollar Gen.
v. Elder to consider whether a chiropractor was qualified to provide medical-causation testimony.115 The supreme court held that with the proper
foundation, a chiropractor could give expert testimony about the causal need
for surgical procedures, even though the chiropractor is not licensed to perform those procedures.116 At the court of appeals, a three-judge panel decided the original case, which our statistics show would not likely result in the
supreme court granting review.117 Yet, this case raised an issue of first impression, which could have explained the granted petition.
In the other cases, the supreme court applied existing law, but the court
granted review following divided decisions at the court of appeals. For example, in James Tree and Crane Serv. v. Fought, the circuit court granted a
motion for new trial, but the court of appeals reversed in a 4-2 decision.118
But on review, the supreme court unanimously affirmed, concluding that the
jury’s zero verdict was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.119
And in Duran v. Sw. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., the supreme court addressed
the duties owed to an independent contractor.120 The court of appeals, with
two judges dissenting, held that the electrical cooperative had no duty to
warn an employee of an independent contractor about the dangers of working around energized electrical equipment.121 The supreme court, in a 4-3
vote, agreed with the court of appeals majority.122
3.

Jury-Trial Waivers and Arbitration

The Arkansas Supreme Court has also granted review in cases that involve the constitutional right to a jury trial and federal law surrounding arbi-

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
87, 93.
122.

See id., 569 S.W.3d 865, 871.
2020 Ark. 208, at 2, 600 S.W.3d 597, 600.
Id. at 14, 600 S.W.3d at 606.
Dollar Gen. Corp v. Elder, 2019 Ark. App. 526, at 1, 589 S.W.3d 437, 440.
2016 Ark. App. 320, at 1, 497 S.W.3d 696, 697.
James Tree & Crane Serv., Inc., 2017 Ark. 173, at 1, 518 S.W.3d 678, 679.
2018 Ark. 33, at 1, 537 S.W.3d 722, 724.
Duran v. Sw. Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp., 2016 Ark. App. 237, at 10, 492 S.W.3d
Duran, 2018 Ark. 33, at 1, 537 S.W.3d 722, 724.
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tration. First, in Tilley v. Malvern National Bank,123 the supreme court considered the constitutionality of pre-dispute jury waivers.124 In that case, a
land developer waived a jury trial in loan documents, but later demanded
one during foreclosure litigation on his common-law counterclaims.125 The
court of appeals held that the jury-waiver was enforceable and that the constitutional right to a jury trial did not extend to the foreclosure proceedings.126 The supreme court reached a different result.127 It held that predispute jury-trial waivers violated article 2, section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution because no law provided for waivers in this context.128 After Tilley,
the Arkansas General Assembly passed a statute that authorized prelitigation
waivers in contracts involving borrowing or lending money.129
In two arbitration cases, the supreme court applied the federal doctrine
of preemption.130 Not surprisingly, the supreme court may be more inclined
to accept review of arbitration cases, even absent a court of appeals split,
when federal law considerations, like the FAA, are at issue.131 In Kilgore v.
Mullenax, the appellant argued that the arbitrator should not have applied
the FAA.132 But, like the court of appeals, the supreme court found that because the parties agreed that the arbitrator would determine jurisdiction, it
was within his authority to apply federal law.133
In Jorja Trading v. Willis, the supreme court applied Arkansas’s law on
mutuality of obligations and upheld an arbitration agreement in an installment-sales contract for a vehicle.134 After reviewing the agreements’ provisions on self-help, class-action waiver, and arbitrator-selection, the supreme
court held that mutuality was satisfied, and it upheld the arbitration agree123. 2017 Ark. 343, 532 S.W.3d 570.
124. Id. at 1, 532 S.W.3d at 572. Because Tilley dealt with first-impression issues concerning the construction or interpretation of the Arkansas Constitution, it is interesting that it
was initially assigned to the court of appeals and was not certified or reassigned to the supreme court. See ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a).
125. Tilley, 2017 Ark. 343, at 2, 532 S.W.3d at 572.
126. Tilley v. Malvern Nat’l Bank, 2017 Ark App. 127, at 4, 515 S.W.3d 636, 640.
127. Tilley, 2017 Ark. 343, at 14–15, 532 S.W.3d at 578–79.
128. Id. at 13–14, 532 S.W.3d at 577–78.
129. Act of March 3, 2018, No. 13 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-30-104 (Supp.
2018)). See Tilley v. Malvern Nat’l Bank, 2019 Ark. 376, at 7, 590 S.W.3d 137, 142 (reversing the circuit court’s application of the new legislation to the matter on remand).
130. E.g., Kilgore v. Mullenax, 2017 Ark. 204, at 1, 520 S.W.3d 670, 672; Jorja Trading,
Inc. v. Willis, 2020 Ark. 133, at 3, 598 S.W.3d 1, 4.
131. The eighth circuit has suggested that “the rule followed in Arkansas with respect to
arbitration agreements . . . violates the FAA[.]” Plummer v. McSweeney, 941 F.3d 341, 347
n.1 (8th Cir. 2019).
132. 2017 Ark. 204, at 4, 520 S.W.3d at 674.
133. Id. at 5, 520 S.W.3d at 674; see Kilgore v. Mullenax, 2016 Ark. App. 143, at 5–6,
485 S.W.3d 705, 708–09.
134. 2020 Ark. 133, at 5–6, 598 S.W.3d at 5–6.
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ment as valid.135 The court of appeals had reached the opposite conclusion
unanimously.136
4.

Immunity

The supreme court accepted review in three cases in which an immunity defense had been raised—one case related to charitable immunity, and
two involved quasi-judicial immunity afforded to court-appointed psychiatrists.137 Like cases in the foregoing section, the supreme court may be more
likely to review a court of appeals decision when it implicates the right to a
jury trial, particularly if it is an issue of first impression. Davis Nursing
Ass’n v. Neal is a good example.138 There, the supreme court held that charitable immunity was a matter of law for the circuit court, not the jury, to decide.139 That said, if the existence of charitable immunity turned on disputed
factual issues, the jury could decide those facts, leaving the circuit court to
decide whether those facts established the immunity.140
In the pair of cases on quasi-judicial immunity, the supreme court set
parameters for immunity for court-appointed physicians.141 First, in an issue
of first impression, the supreme court held that nonjudicial actors, like courtappointed psychiatrists, are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity
from suit if they serve an integral function to the judicial process.142 In Martin v. Smith, Kenneth McFadden, who was conditionally released from prison, had to receive psychiatric treatment under the terms of his release.143 Dr.
Smith’s agency had to monitor McFadden’s compliance with his prescribed
treatment regimen and report back to the circuit court.144 The supreme court

135. Id. at 6–9, 598 S.W.3d at 6–7. The supreme court recently denied a petition for review that asked the court to clarify its decision in Jorja Trading. See Order, EBF Partners,
LLC v. Letha’s Pies, LLC, No. CV-19-949 (Ark. Sept. 23, 2021) (order denying petition for
review); see also EBF Partners, LLC v. Letha’s Pies, LLC, 2021 Ark. App. 187, at 10, 625
S.W.3d 713, 720 (reversing denial of motion to compel arbitration). But the court subsequently commented on Jorja Trading in an appeal from a class-certification order. See Funding Metrics, LLC v. Letha’s Pies, LLC, 2022 Ark. 73, 2022 WL 1042970.
136. Jorja Trading, Inc. v. Willis, 2018 Ark. App. 574, at 8–9, 566 S.W.3d 510, 516.
137. E.g., John v. Faitak, 2020 Ark. 105, at 1, 594 S.W.3d 871, 872 (judicial immunity);
Martin v. Smith, 2019 Ark. 232, at 1, 576 S.W.3d 32, 34 (judicial immunity); Davis Nursing
Ass’n v. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 1, 570 S.W.3d 457, 458 (charitable immunity).
138. Davis Nursing Ass’n, 2019 Ark. 91, at 6; 570 S.W.3d at 461.
139. Id. at 6–7, 570 S.W.3d at 461.
140. Id., 570 S.W.3d at 461.
141. See John, 2020 Ark. 105, at 3, 594 S.W.3d at 873; Martin, 2019 Ark. 232, at 1, 576
S.W.3d at 34.
142. Martin, 2019 Ark. 232, at 8, 576 S.W.3d at 37.
143. Id. at 2, 576 S.W.3d at 34.
144. Id., 576 S.W.3d at 34.
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held that Dr. Smith’s treatment of McFadden fell within the scope of the
judicial function, and thus he was immune from liability.145
Shortly after Martin, the supreme court reviewed a second case on judicial immunity of a court-appointed expert in John v. Faitak.146 Yet in
Faitak, the supreme court found that the therapist was not entitled to judicial
immunity because his actions exceeded the scope of the circuit court’s appointment.147 In that case, the circuit court had appointed Faitak to perform
psychological examinations and conduct monthly mediation sessions with a
couple involved in a custody dispute.148 The husband alleged that Faitak
exceeded the scope of the circuit court’s order by individually diagnosing
him, disclosing that diagnosis during a session with the wife, and using ex
parte communications with the wife’s counsel to broker a settlement in the
custody case.149 The supreme court held that Faitak was not immune because
the alleged acts pled by the husband were outside the scope of the custody
order.150
Martin and Faitak serve as further examples of a group of cases accepted by the supreme court to address unresolved areas of the law.151 Martin established a new rule on quasi-judicial immunity, and Faitak, which
was decided shortly after Martin, established a parameter of that rule.152
Finding immunity in Martin but none in Faitak allowed the supreme court
to establish a spectrum of when the immunity would apply.153
5.

Trusts

The supreme court also reviewed two trust cases,154 both of which involved charities.155 These cases had interesting procedural postures at the
court of appeals. In both cases, a six-judge panel from the court of appeals
entered a substituted opinion on rehearing following a unanimous decision
145. Id. at 8, 576 S.W.3d at 37.
146. 2020 Ark. 105, 594 S.W.3d 871.
147. Id. at 6, 594 S.W.3d at 874.
148. Id. at 2, 594 S.W.3d at 872–73.
149. Id. at 2–3, 594 S.W.3d at 873.
150. Id. at 6, 594 S.W.3d at 874–75.
151. See discussion supra Part IV.D.1 (compare with the guardianship cases discussed
when the supreme court accepted three cases to develop that area of the law).
152. Martin v. Smith, 2019 Ark. 232, at 8, 576 S.W.3d 32, 37; John v. Faitak, 2020 Ark.
105, at 3, 594 S.W.3d 871, 873.
153. See Martin, 2019 Ark. 232, at 1, 576 S.W.3d at 872; John, 2020 Ark. 105 at 6, 594
S.W.3d at 874.
154. One of these cases, Covenant Presbytery, should have probably been assigned a
probate case number because it dealt with the administration of a trust. 2016 Ark. 138, 489
S.W.3d 153; see in re Admin. Order No. 14(1)(b), 351 Ark. Appx. 713 (2003).
155. See Stone v. Washington Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2017 Ark. 90, 515 S.W.3d 104; Covenant
Presbytery v. First Baptist Church, 2016 Ark. 138, 489 S.W.3d 153.
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from a three-judge panel.156 These substituted opinions may have drawn
attention during the supreme court’s consideration of the petition for review.
First, in Covenant Presbytery v. First Baptist Church, a three-judge
panel of the court of appeals issued a decision, a petition for rehearing followed, and it was denied.157 Yet the court of appeals issued a substituted
opinion by a six-judge panel the same day. On the merits, appellee’s petition
for review to the supreme court alleged that the court of appeals had created
a new legal standard and misrepresented the Trust Code.158 The supreme
court granted review and ultimately reached the same decision as the court
of appeals.159
In Stone v. Wash. Reg. Med’l Ctr, the supreme court also granted review following a substituted opinion from the court of appeals.160 There, a
three-judge panel initially affirmed the circuit court’s decision.161 But the
court of appeals granted a petition for rehearing, and a six-judge panel affirmed again.162 The supreme court granted review and also affirmed. In
both these cases, the result was the same as the court of appeals, and neither
case raised an issue of first impression. Thus, in addition to a six-judge panel factoring high into the likelihood of a petition for review being granted,
our analysis suggests a substituted opinion may also be a factor.
6.

Contracts

The last grouping of civil cases involves contracts, for which the supreme court accepted review in just two cases.163 One came from a six-judge
panel and one from a nine-judge panel, and the supreme court reached a
different decision from the court of appeals in both.164 In Miracle Kids Success Acad. v. Maurras, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s motion for summary judgment, concluding whether the term of the loan agree156. Covenant Presbytery v. First Baptist Church, 2015 Ark. App. 233, substituted by
2015 Ark. App. 417, 467 S.W.3d 190; Stone v. Washington Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2016 Ark. 165,
substituted by 2016 Ark. App. 236, 490 S.W.3d 669.
157. See 2015 Ark. App. 233, substituted by 2015 Ark. App. 417, at 10, 467 S.W.3d 190,
197.
158. Petition for Rehearing, 1–2, Covenant Presbytery v. First Baptist Church, 2015 Ark.
App. 417, 467 S.W.3d 190 (No. CV-14-891).
159. Covenant Presbytery, 2016 Ark. 138, at 8, 489 S.W.3d at 158.
160. 2017 Ark. 90, at 4, 515 S.W.3d at 107.
161. Stone v. Washington Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2016 Ark. App. 236, at 2 n.2, 490 S.W.3d
669, 671 n.2.
162. Stone, 2016 Ark. App. 236, at 2 n.2, 490 S.W.3d at 671 n.2.
163. Miracle Kids Success Acad., Inc. v. Maurras, 2019 Ark. 146, 573 S.W.3d 533; Farris
v. Conger, 2017 Ark. 83, 512 S.W.3d 631.
164. 2018 Ark. App. 40, 539 S.W.3d 603, vacated, 2019 Ark. 146, 573 S.W.3d 533;
Farris v. Conger, 2016 Ark. App. 230, 490 S.W.3d 684, vacated, 2017 Ark. 83, 512 S.W.3d
631.
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ment allowed the lender to demand immediate repayment was an issue of
material fact.165 But the supreme court affirmed.166 In Farris v. Conger, a
nine-judge panel of the court of appeals concluded that a customer’s claim
against his wealth management service provider was subject to the threeyear statute of limitations.167 Still, three judges dissented in this result.168 The
supreme court reached a different outcome.169 It concluded that the claim
sounded in breach of contract rather than negligence, and therefore, the circuit court erred in applying the three-year statute of limitations.170
B.

Criminal

The supreme court granted 19 petitions for review in criminal cases.171
It denied 194, which means the supreme court granted criminal petitions at a
rate of 8.92%.172 The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals’ disposition in 9 cases and reached a different disposition in 10 cases.173 The
granted cases fall into three broad categories: (1) sufficiency of the evidence; (2) evidentiary issues; and (3) motions to suppress. Three other miscellaneous cases involved procedural issues, including the procedure for
appealing from district court to circuit court174 and judicial recusal.175
The criminal cases on which the supreme court granted review suggest
the court rarely accepted cases alleging error correction. Issues accepted on
review usually involved an issue of first impression, a constitutional challenge, or a case that could have a statewide impact. An incisive dissent from
a judge on the court of appeals is another common thread.
1.

Sufficiency Cases

The first broad category involves challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence. These challenges required the court to construe a criminal statute176 or decide whether enough evidence supported a conviction for negli165. Miracle Kids Success Acad., Inc., 2018 Ark. App. 40, at 11–12, 539 S.W.3d at 609–
10.
166. Miracle Kids Success Acad., Inc., 2019 Ark. 146, at 5, 573 S.W.3d at 535–36.
167. Farris, 2016 Ark. App. 230, at 6, 490 S.W.3d at 687–88.
168. Id. (Harrison, Glover, and Hoofman, JJ., dissenting).
169. Farris v. Conger, 2017 Ark. 83, at 1, 512 S.W.3d 631, 632.
170. Id. at 7, 512 S.W.3d at 632.
171. See supra Chart 3.
172. See id.
173. See supra Chart 6.
174. Treat v. State, 2019 Ark. 326, at 4, 588 S.W.3d 10, 14; Collins v. State, 2021 Ark.
80, at 1.
175. Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. 319, at 1, 498 S.W.3d 733, 734.
176. E.g., Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 6–8, 471 S.W.3d 637, 641–42.
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gent homicide.177 The largest category of these cases, however, involved
possession crimes, when the court, either in a gun or drug case, had to address whether enough evidence supported the possession conviction.178
A trilogy of cases highlights this. In Pokatilov v. State, a divided court
of appeals affirmed a drug-possession conviction.179 The majority applied a
constructive-possession theory to affirm the conviction.180 Three judges dissented, arguing that the jury instructions should have included language
about the defendant’s knowledge of the contraband.181 On review, the supreme court unanimously agreed with the court of appeals majority, holding
the evidence was sufficient on a constructive-possession theory and that
additional instructions were not required.182
But in two other drug-possession cases, the supreme court affirmed
convictions where a unanimous court of appeals had reversed and dismissed.
In Kellensworth v. State, the court of appeals reversed a controlledsubstances possession conviction because the State’s expert only visually
identified the drugs.183 And in Kolb v. State, a divided 5-4 court of appeals
reversed a methamphetamine-possession conviction because the State presented no evidence the defendant had a “usable amount” of the drug.184 The
four dissenting judges would have upheld the conviction.185
The supreme court reached a different result in both cases. In Kellensworth, a unanimous supreme court concluded the expert’s testimony
based on visual confirmation constituted sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed the drugs.186 The supreme court cited both Arkansas cases and
several cases from out-of-state jurisdictions, suggesting the issue raised was
somewhat novel.187 In Kolb, the supreme court found on a 6-1 split that sufficient evidence supported the conviction.188 Only one justice would have
reversed.189 The majority opinion cited Arkansas cases exclusively.190
Kolb and Kellensworth are similar in that the court of appeals reversed
and dismissed a conviction, but the supreme court disagreed. Even so, in the
177. E.g., Gill v. State, 2015 Ark. 421, at 7–8, 474 S.W.3d 77, 81–82.
178. E.g., Pokatilov v. State, 2017 Ark. 264, 526 S.W.3d 849; Kellensworth v. State,
2021 Ark. 5, 614 S.W.3d 804; Kolb v. State, 2021 Ark. 58, 2021 WL 926282.
179. 2017 Ark. App. 150, at 1, 516 S.W.3d 285, 288.
180. Id. at 5, 516 S.W.3d at 290.
181. Id. at 16, 516 S.W.3d at 296 (Virden, J., dissenting).
182. Pokatilov v. State, 2017 Ark. 264, at 1, 8, 526 S.W.3d 849, 852, 856.
183. 2020 Ark. App. 249, at 8, 600 S.W.3d 622, 629.
184. 2020 Ark. App. 305, at 4–5, 602 S.W.3d 128, 130.
185. Id. at 5–7, 602 S.W.3d at 130–31 (Klappenbach, J., dissenting).
186. Kellensworth v. State, 2021 Ark. 5, at 7, 614 S.W.3d 804, 809.
187. Id. at 4–7, 614 S.W.3d at 808–09.
188. Kolb v. State, 2021 Ark. 58, at 5–6, 2021 WL 926282, at *1.
189. Id. at 6, 2021 WL 926282, at *1 (Wynne, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 1–5, 2021 WL 926282, at *1.
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cases we reviewed, the supreme court did not always side with the State in
sufficiency cases. In two other sufficiency cases taken on petition for review, the supreme court unanimously reversed convictions where it found
the proof wanting.191 And in both cases the court of appeals had affirmed.192
2.

Evidentiary Issues

The second broad category involved evidentiary issues that fell into
two subsets. The first subset involved the defendant’s access to evidence
either in the State’s hands or in the hands of a third party.193 The second subset involved evidence the defendant tried to introduce at trial or sentencing.194 For example, in two cases, a rape defendant requested access to the
victim’s psychiatric records.195 In both cases, the supreme court, like the
court of appeals,196 concluded the defendant had no right to access the records. But both cases prompted strong dissents in which the dissenters would
have allowed the defendant access based on his constitutional right to present a defense.197
3.

Motions to Suppress

The third broad category involved motions to suppress. The supreme
court accepted four of these cases in the period.198 The supreme court’s interest in these cases should come as no surprise given the constitutional basis of search-and-seizure law. In addition, two of these cases raised issues of
important, statewide concern.
For example, in Pickle v. State, the supreme court held that the Gameand-Fish-Commission officers lacked reasonable suspicion to start a crimi191. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 8, 471 S.W.3d 637, 643; Gill v. State, 2015 Ark.
421, at 9, 474 S.W.3d 77, 82.
192. McCann-Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 27, at 1, 453 S.W.3d 709, 710; Gill v. State,
2015 Ark. App. 162, at 1, 457 S.W.3d 674, 676.
193. See Holland v. State, 2015 Ark. 341, at 12, 471 S.W.3d 179, 187; Harmon v. State,
2020 Ark. 217, at 4–7, 600 S.W.3d 586, 589–91; Vaughn v. State, 2020 Ark. 313, at 4–5, 608
S.W.3d 569, 572; Lambert v. State, 2017 Ark. 31, at 5, 509 S.W.3d 637, 641.
194. Edwards v. State, 2015 Ark. 377, at 1, 472 S.W.3d 479, 480.
195. Holland, 2015 Ark. 341, at 12–13, 471 S.W.3d at 187; Vaughn, 2020 Ark. 313, at 2,
608 S.W.3d at 571.
196. Holland v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 644, at 12, 448 S.W.3d 220, 228; Vaughn v. State,
2020 Ark. App. 185, at 18, 598 S.W.3d 549, 560.
197. Holland, 2015 Ark. 341, at 19–22, 471 S.W.3d at 190–92 (Wynne & Hart, JJ., dissenting); Vaughn, 2020 Ark. 313, at 11–20, 608 S.W.3d at 575–80 (Wynne & Hart, JJ., dissenting).
198. See Pickle v. State, 2015 Ark. 286, at 1, 466 S.W.3d 410, 411; Schneider v. State,
2015 Ark. 152, at 1, 459 S.W.3d 296, 297; Whalen v. State, 2016 Ark. 343, at 1, 500 S.W.3d
710, 711; Shay v. State, 2018 Ark. 393, at 1, 562 S.W.3d 832, 833.
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nal investigation when, after completing a regulatory hunting compliance
check, the officers also searched the defendant’s name in a warrant database.199 A commentator has suggested that the supreme court’s ruling in
Pickle could have implications not only to Game-and-Fish searches but to
other police-citizen encounters.200
The supreme court also accepted review in Whalen v. State.201 The supreme court held an Arkansas State Police sobriety checkpoint was unconstitutional because it failed to follow a preexisting plan and gave field officers unfettered discretion.202 The supreme court adopted a two-part test to
analyze sobriety checkpoints going forward.203 The new test provides guidance for future law-enforcement-sobriety checkpoints.
The two other motion-to-suppress cases concerned more routine automobile stops. The first case involved a split in the relevant legal authorities.
In Schneider v. State, a unanimous court of appeals upheld a traffic stop
when the police ran a license-plate check and discovered the car’s color did
not match its registration; this discrepancy was the sole basis for the stop.204
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals noted, “[d]ifferent courts
have reached different conclusions on the issue presented here.”205 Again, a
split in authority is a factor the supreme court may consider when accepting
the case on petition for review, and a unanimous supreme court concluded
the stop had been illegal.206
And even when the issue prompted no split in authority, our analysis
showed that a lone dissent from a six-judge court of appeals panel might
influence the decision to grant a petition for review. In Shay v. State, a divided 5-1 court of appeals held a search had been unlawful when a police
officer, after finding the defendant inside a parked car, searched the defendant’s wallet after he had been “fidgeting . . . with his pockets[.]”207 The lone
dissenting judge would have affirmed, arguing that the defendant consented
to the search.208 Ultimately the supreme court agreed with the majority that

199. 2015 Ark. 286, at 7, 466 S.W.3d at 414.
200. Ben Honaker, Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure—We’ve
Got Ourselves in A Pickle: The Supreme Court of Arkansas’s Recent Expansion of Fourth
Amendment Rights May Have Unintended Consequences, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
299, 301 (2017).
201. 2016 Ark. 343, 500 S.W.3d 710.
202. Id. at 6–7, 500 S.W.3d at 714.
203. Id. at 8, 500 S.W.3d at 714.
204. 2014 Ark. App. 711, at 2, 452 S.W.3d 601, 602.
205. Id. at 4, 452 S.W.3d at 603.
206. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4(d)(ii); Schneider v. State, 2015 Ark. 152, at 2–6, 459 S.W.3d
296, 300.
207. 2018 Ark. App. 101, at 6, 542 S.W.3d 885, 889.
208. Id. at 15, 542 S.W.3d at 894 (Glover, J., dissenting).
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the defendant did not consent.209 But two justices dissented and would have
found that the defendant consented.210 And a concurring justice thought the
circuit court never made the requisite findings about consent.211
C.

Juvenile

The supreme court granted review in nine juvenile cases, a little over
12.68% of the total petitions filed within this case type.212 All of these were
child-welfare cases involving dependency-neglect.213 The supreme court did
not accept review in any juvenile-delinquency cases. Of the cases reviewed,
the supreme court reached the same result as the court of appeals in less than
half of the cases.214 While the percentage of granted petitions in this subject
matter was about average when compared with the overall grant rate
(11.92%), the types of cases showed some similarities. In sum, the supreme
court granted review in juvenile cases when procedural errors dictated the
outcome at the circuit court or court of appeals.
For example, in seven of the juvenile cases reviewed, a procedural issue was alleged. Again, this trend traversed case types. In five of the juvenile cases, the procedural issues emanated from the circuit court.215 In Earls
v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, the circuit court terminated a
father’s parental rights to his two children, and he appealed to the court of
appeals.216 The court of appeals affirmed.217 The supreme court granted review and reversed the circuit court.218 As the supreme court held, the circuit

209. Shay v. State, 2018 Ark. 393, at 8, 562 S.W.3d 832, 836.
210. Id. at 10, 562 S.W.3d at 837 (Womack, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 8, 562 S.W.3d at 836 (Goodson, J., concurring).
212. See supra Chart 3.
213. See infra Appendix.
214. See supra Chart 5.
215. See Edwards v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. 402, at 7, 474 S.W.3d 58, 62
(dismissing because the underlying order was not appealable); Ellis v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2016 Ark. 441, at 8, 505 S.W.3d 678, 683 (noting the juvenile court failed to hold a
timely review hearing); Ponder v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs, 2016 Ark. 261, at 5, 494
S.W.3d 426, 429; Martin v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs, 2017 Ark. 115, at 17–19, 515 S.W.3d
at 610–11 (noting the circuit court’s failure to hold timely adjudication, review, and permanency-planning hearings) (Wood, J., concurring); Earls v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs, 2017
Ark. 171, at 11–12, 518 S.W.3d 81, 88 (holding the juvenile court terminated the father’s
paternal rights before those rights attached under the statute); Langston v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. 152, at 3, 574 S.W.3d 138, 140 (holding that the mother failed to
preserve the argument that denial of counsel’s motion to withdraw violated the Sixth
Amendment).
216. 2017 Ark. App. 53, at 7, 511 S.W.3d 373, 377.
217. Id. at 10, 511 S.W.3d at 378.
218. Earls, 2017 Ark. 171, at 12, 518 S.W.3d at 88.
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court committed a procedural error in terminating the father’s parental rights
without first establishing him as the legal parent.219
But in two other cases, the procedural error occurred at the appellate
level. In Minor Children v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, the
court of appeals dismissed an appeal brought by minor children following
their permanent placement by the juvenile court.220 The court of appeals held
the appellants failed to timely file their notice of appeal in twenty-one days
as required by Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(b)(1).221 The supreme
court granted review and held that because the children were appealing from
a permanent-custody order, the appeal fell under Rule 2 and Rule 4 of the
Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure-Civil; therefore, they had thirty days
to file their notice of appeal.222 The supreme court then remanded to the
court of appeals for consideration of the merits of the appeal.223 In another
case, the supreme court held the court of appeals improperly issued a memorandum opinion and remanded for full consideration of the merits.224
D.

Probate

In probate cases, the supreme court accepted review in ten out of the
thirty-four petitions filed or around 29%.225 Surprisingly, the probate cases
were granted at the highest rate of all case types. The second highest rate
was workers’ compensation cases, which were granted at a rate of around
20%. In half of the probate cases, the supreme court reached a different result from the court of appeals.226
Our results show that the supreme court granted review most often in
probate cases when the issue involved child-custody type disputes stemming
from guardianships and adoptions, rather than “typical” probate matters involving the administration of decedents’ estates. The supreme court reviewed only one case concerning the administration of a trust.227 And it reviewed two other cases concerning procedural matters, including mootness
and permissive intervention. 228
219. Id., 518 S.W.3d at 88.
220. 2019 Ark. App. 242, at 1, 576 S.W.3d 67, 68.
221. Id., 576 S.W.3d 67, 68.
222. Minor Children v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. 243, at 5–6, 582 S.W.3d at
845–46.
223. Id., 582 S.W.3d at 845–46.
224. Furnish v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. 240, at 2, 2017 WL 3300524, at *1
(remanding for full opinion from court of appeals).
225. See supra Chart 3.
226. See supra Chart 6.
227. See In re Hamilton Living, 2015 Ark. 367, 471 S.W.3d 203.
228. See Whaley v. Beckham, 2016 Ark. 196, 492 S.W.3d 65; Norris v. Davis, 2015 Ark.
442, 476 S.W.3d 163.
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As the supreme court wrote in Matter of Adoption of A.M.P.,”[p]arental
rights and the integrity of the family unit have always been a concern of this
state and their protection regarded as a proper function of the courts[.]”229 In
particular, guardianship and adoption cases stand out as areas where (1) the
supreme court is more likely to accept review and (2) the supreme court
clarifies and develops the law through cases, which may often involve factbased inquiries, especially if the court of appeals decision was divided. And
as discussed below in the domestic-relations section, the supreme court has
routinely scrutinized cases involving custody, parental rights, and visitation.
Questions about the placement of children, whether in a guardianship or
following a divorce, have been a common thread where the supreme court
has granted review.
1.

Guardianship

The supreme court used the petition-for-review process in probate matters to settle unresolved guardianship law in Arkansas through a series of
cases. Guardianships are governed by state statutes, provided the law respects parents’ rights to the “care, control, and custody of [their] children”
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.230 In
2015, the first case reviewed in this series was In the Matter of W.L.231
There, the supreme court refined the standard in guardianship cases and
overruled prior decisions.232 The court held: “In short, our judicially created,
two-step tests are ineffective to protect a fit parent’s fundamental rights and
are divorced from the statutory text. The best path is to abandon the tests
and bring termination-of-guardianship cases in line with the statute.”233
The supreme court followed In the Matter of W.L. by accepting review
in another guardianship matter the next year.234 In Donley v. Donley, the
supreme court acknowledged that “[t]ermination of guardianship cases have
been in a recent state of flux.”235 And in a rare instance, in Morris v. Clark,
the court explained the reason for granting review: “[a]cknowledging that
our jurisprudence would benefit from further development on the Termination Statute analysis, we granted review in the present matter. . . .”236 The
229. In re Adoption of A.M.P., 2021 Ark. 125, at 5, 623 S.W.3d 571, 575.
230. In re Guardianship of W.L., 2015 Ark. 289, at 5–6, 467 S.W.3d 129, 132–33.
231. Id. at 6, 467 S.W.3d at 133. The route to clarifying guardianship law began in 2015
when a case the supreme court had taken on appeal on an issue of first impression returned to
the court. In re Guardianship of S.H., 2015 Ark. 75, 455 S.W.3d 313.
232. Id. at 6–9, 467 S.W.3d at 132–34.
233. Id. at 9, 467 S.W.3d at 134.
234. See Donley v. Donley, 2016 Ark. 243, at 8–9, 767, 493 S.W.3d 762, 767.
235. Id. at 9, 767, 493 S.W.3d at 767 (citing In re Guardianship of W.L., 2015 Ark. 289,
467 S.W.3d 129).
236. 2019 Ark. 130, at 8, 572 S.W.3d 366, 371.
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supreme court also explained that the circuit court did not have the benefit
of the latest supreme court’s opinion setting forth the correct standard for
termination of a guardianship.237 It therefore remanded for the circuit court
to reconsider the evidence in light of the correct legal standard.238
The supreme court did not accept a petition for review in a guardianship matter again until 2019.239 And once again, that case, Morris v. Clark,
involved the standard required for a parent to terminate a guardianship.240 In
Morris, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision to deny the
mother’s petition to terminate a guardianship.241 On review, the supreme
court disagreed and emphasized a fit parent’s constitutional right to raise her
child.242 Guardianships stand out as an area where the supreme court routinely granted petitions for review to clarify ambiguities, to correct misapplication of the law, and to afford more constitutional safeguards.
2.

Adoption

The supreme court also reviewed four adoption cases. Three involved
fact-based questions that produced multiple opinions from the court of appeals. The other involved a jurisdictional issue involving the sufficiency of
an adoption petition.
Three of the adoption cases concerned adoption by a stepparent over a
biological parent’s objection. Each involved the interpretation of the relevant statute.243 This statute provides that a parent’s consent to adoption is not
required if the parent, for a period of a least one year, “has failed significantly and without justifiable cause (i) to communicate with the child or (ii) to
provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial
decree[.]”244 Even though this analysis is fact-driven, each of the three adoption cases involved multiple opinions from the court of appeals, which may
explain the supreme court’s decision to review.
In Martini v. Price, the court of appeals, by a vote of 5-4, affirmed an
adoption decree without the biological father’s consent.245 The issue raised
was whether the father failed to communicate to his child without justifiable

237. Donley, 2016 Ark. 243, at 11, 493 S.W.3d at 769.
238. Id., 493 S.W.3d at 769.
239. See Morris, 2019 Ark. 130, 572 S.W.3d 366.
240. Id. at 1, 572 S.W.3d at 367.
241. 2018 Ark. App. 73, at 10, 542 S.W.3d 191, 197.
242. Morris, 2019 Ark. 130, at 4, 572 S.W.3d at 368–69. But see Act of March 28, 2017,
No. 717(codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-401 (Supp. 2017)) (amending the termination
statute).
243. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-207(a)(2) (2021).
244. Id.
245. 2015 Ark. App. 684, at 8, 476 S.W.3d 867, 870.
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cause, a fact-based inquiry.246 The supreme court accepted review and even
noted the 5-4 split in the majority opinion.247 The court, in a 6-1 vote, ultimately agreed with the dissenting judges at the court of appeals, concluding
the father’s consent was required and reversing the trial court’s contrary
factual finding.248
In Rodgers v. Rodgers, the central issue was whether a mother’s consent to adoption was required after she failed to communicate with her children for more than a year.249 The court of appeals affirmed the stepmother’s
adoption because the children’s mother had substantially failed to communicate with or support her children.250 However, one judge concurred, stating
that he thought the mother’s failure to communicate with her children was
justifiable because the circuit court judge had previously ordered the mother
not to have “any visitation at all with [her] children.”251
Like the court of appeals, the supreme court affirmed, but the court’s
reasoning was fractured.252 Only two justices agreed with the court of appeals majority.253 Two justices concluded that the mother had failed to provide care and support but was justified in not communicating with her children.254 Two justices dissented, contending the mother was justified in failing to communicate and support her children because the circuit court had
ordered her to neither communicate with the children nor pay child support.255 Finally, one justice wrote that her failure to communicate was unjustified for part of the time, but not for one year.256
The last fact-driven adoption case was Matter of Adoption of A.M.P.
and A.A.P, where the court of appeals reversed a stepparent adoption.257 It
concluded that the biological father’s failure to provide care and support for
his children was justified because the divorce decree explicitly relieved him
of the duty to pay child support; therefore, his failure to pay child support
could not be used against him.258 One judge concurred, noting the court of
appeals’ “recent pattern in stepparent-adoption cases and the effect that this

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 7, 476 S.W.3d at 870.
Martini v. Price, 2016 Ark. 472, at 1, 507 S.W.3d 486, 487.
Id. at 5, 507 S.W.3d at 489.
Rodgers v. Rodgers, 2017 Ark. 182, at 1, 519 S.W.3d 324, 326.
Rodgers v. Rodgers, 2016 Ark. App. 447, at 12–13, 503 S.W.3d 102, 109–10.
Id. at 13–16, 503 S.W.3d at 110–12.
Rodgers, 2017 Ark. 182, 519 S.W.3d 324.
Id. at 8, 519 S.W.3d at 329.
Id. at 8–9, 519 S.W.3d at 329–30 (Wynne, J., concurring).
Id. at 10–12, 519 S.W.3d at 330–31 (Baker, J., dissenting).
Id. at 13–15, 519 S.W.3d at 331–33 (Womack, J., dissenting).
In re Adoption of A.M.P., 2020 Ark. App. 568, at 1, 2020 WL 7239558, at *1.
Id. at 6, 2020 WL 7239558, at *2–3.
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pattern has on our standard of review.”259 The supreme court accepted review and unanimously agreed with the court of appeals.260
Finally, the courts wrestled with a jurisdictional issue in Lagios v.
Goldman. There, the court of appeals affirmed an adoption decree over the
biological father’s objection.261 The father raised numerous procedural arguments on appeal, including that the probate court lacked jurisdiction and
that the petition for adoption failed to comply with the statute.262 One judge
concurred, however, expressing concerns about the adoption petition’s deficiencies.263 On review, the supreme court extensively discussed the jurisdictional issue and corrected confusion in caselaw that suggested failure to
strictly comply with the adoption statutes deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction.264
E.

Domestic Relations

The supreme court granted review in about 18% of domestic-relations
petitions.265 The supreme court reached a different disposition from the court
of appeals 64.7% of the time, the highest rate among all case types.266 In
general, domestic appeals fell into three broad categories: (1) financial questions about property division and alimony; (2) child-custody issues; and (3)
procedural issues. In many of these cases, multiple opinions were written at
the court of appeals, further evidencing that the supreme court granted review from six- and nine-judge panels at higher rates.
The domestic-relations cases also show the supreme court’s approach
to finality issues. In several cases, a unanimous supreme court found that
divorce decrees were final and appealable when the court of appeals had
not.267 These cases also show the court’s flexibility as to the disposition of
the case on review. In some cases, the supreme court simply disposed of the
finality decision and remanded to the court of appeals. In others, the supreme court itself considered the merits and overruled a line of authority
involving the interpretation of the property-division statute. This shows that
the supreme court, when faced with a decision to remand or decide the mer-

259. Id. at 7, 2020 WL 7239558, at *3 (Whiteaker, J., concurring).
260. In re Adoption of A.M.P., 2021 Ark. 125, at 9, 623 S.W.3d 571, 577.
261. Lagios v. Goldman, 2015 Ark. App. 329, at 12, 463 S.W.3d 726, 733.
262. Id. at 4–7, 463 S.W.3d at 729–32.
263. Id. at 12–13, 463 S.W.3d at 733–34.
264. Lagios v. Goldman, 2016 Ark. 59. at 7–9, 483 S.W.3d 810, 816–17.
265. See supra Chart 3.
266. See supra Chart 6.
267. This does not just occur in domestic law cases. The supreme court found in a probate
case that the circuit court’s order had been final when the court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion. See In re Hamilton Living Trust, 2015 Ark. 367, at 1, 471 S.W.3d 203, 205.
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its, may choose the latter course when the merits require the supreme court
to settle precedent.
1.

Property Division

Domestic appeals about property division usually concerned a novel
legal question or notable dissent from the court of appeals. For example, in
Foster v. Foster, the court of appeals considered rehabilitative alimony.268
Upon review, supreme court held, as a matter of first impression, that the
relevant factors governing permanent alimony also apply to rehabilitative
alimony.269 This issue arose because the Arkansas Legislature passed a new
law reclassifying “temporary alimony” as “rehabilitative alimony.”270
The supreme court again decided novel legal issues in Pelts v. Pelts.271
There, the supreme court held a husband’s active-duty military retirement
benefits did not vest at the time of the divorce decree; thus, the court reversed the circuit court’s division of that benefit.272 In a 5-1 decision, the
court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion.273 The dissenting judge’s
opinion may have tipped the supreme court off that review was warranted. It
noted that the court of appeal’s majority’s decision conflicted with binding
precedent and that the holding “should be pronounced by either our supreme
court or the Department of Defense, but not by our court .”274
Another appeal involving a matter of first impression was Cherry v.
Cherry.275 The novel issue in that case concerned alimony after a structured
settlement.276 The husband had suffered work-related injury that left him
totally disabled.277 He received a structured settlement, paid out by annuities,
that he received in compensation.278 The circuit court imputed this income to
the husband for the purpose of alimony.279 A 5-4 majority from the court of
appeals affirmed the award.280 Yet the four dissenting judges would have
reversed on an issue they characterized as one “of first impression for Ar-

268. Foster v. Foster, 2015 Ark. App. 530, at 4, 472 S.W.3d 151, 154.
269. Foster v. Foster, 2016 Ark. 456, at 10, 506 S.W.3d 808, 815.
270. Id. at 8, 506 S.W.3d at 814; see also Act of April 22, 2013, No. 1487 (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-312 (Supp. 2019)).
271. 2017 Ark. 98, 514 S.W.3d 455.
272. Id. at 4–5, 514 S.W.3d at 457–58.
273. Pelts v. Pelts, 2016 Ark. App. 75, at 8–10, 482 S.W.3d 345, 350–51.
274. Id. at 12, 482 S.W.3d at 352 (Hixson, J., dissenting).
275. 2021 Ark. 49, 617 S.W.3d 692.
276. Cherry v. Cherry, 2020 Ark. App. 294, at 3, 603 S.W.3d 585, 590.
277. Id. at 2, 603 S.W.3d at 589.
278. Id. at 2, 603 S.W.3d at 590.
279. Id. at 3, 603 S.W.3d at 590.
280. Id. at 19, 603 S.W.3d at 598.
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kansas’s alimony law[.]”281 The supreme court took the case on review and
ultimately reached the same decision as the court of appeals’ majority.282
Even though most of the granted petitions for review in the propertydivision category involved first-impression legal questions, one case shows
how a strong dissent from the court of appeals on a fact question might attract review from the supreme court.283 In Symanietz v. Symanietz, the circuit
court imputed a $3,400 monthly income to the husband for child support and
ordered him to pay alimony.284 A 6-3 majority affirmed.285 Still, the dissent
pointed out that, under one construction of the decree, the husband could be
left with only $600 per month net income after he paid alimony and child
support, less than the federal poverty level.286 The dissent conceded the appeal raised no novel legal issues; instead, it noted that the majority’s decision was authorized by a “deferential standard of review[.]”287 Even though
the appeal turned on these factual questions, the supreme court accepted
review, ultimately reaching the same conclusion as the court of appeals’
majority.288
2.

Child Custody

The second category of domestic-relations appeals involved child custody. At times, the supreme court granted review even though the relevant
law was clear, and the decision rested mainly on factual disputes. The supreme court may have reviewed these fact-dependent custody disputes when
a significant split occurred at the court of appeals.
For example, in McCoy v. Kincade, a mother and father shared joint
custody of their children.289 Nine years later, the circuit court found a material change of circumstances and granted the father primary custody.290 A 51 majority from the court of appeals affirmed despite a lengthy dissenting
opinion.291 The supreme court granted review and, like the court of appeals,
affirmed the change of custody by a 5-2 vote.292 The supreme court noted no

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 19, 603 S.W.3d at 599 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
Cherry v. Cherry, 2021 Ark. 49, at 15–16, 617 S.W.3d 692, 701.
See Symanietz v. Symanietz, 2020 Ark. App. 394, 609 S.W.3d 643.
Id. at 2, 609 S.W.3d at 645.
Id. at 13, 609 S.W.3d at 651.
Id., 609 S.W.3d at 651 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
Id., 609 S.W.3d at 651 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
Symanietz v. Symanietz, 2021 Ark. 75, at 9, 620 S.W.3d 518, 525.
2014 Ark. App. 664, at 2, 448 S.W.3d 740.
Id. at 3, 448 S.W.3d at 741.
Id. at 4–10, 448 S.W.3d at 742–45.
McCoy v. Kincade, 2015 Ark. 389, at 4, 473 S.W.3d 8, at 11.
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novel legal question and analyzed the case using the court’s typical standard
of review.293
The supreme court also reviewed another fact-dependent case about
child-custody modification in Pace v. Pace.294 There, the circuit court denied
a petition to alter a joint-custody arrangement.295 The court of appeals affirmed the order by a 5-4 vote.296 A unanimous supreme court reached the
same conclusion.297
But the supreme court also reviewed a case that raised new legal questions. In Cooper v. Kalkwarf, the supreme court clarified the legal standard
for relocation cases.298 The supreme court had recently decided that, when
parents share joint custody, the relocating parent is not entitled to a presumption that the move is in the child’s best interest.299 The court of appeals
split in a 5-4 vote applying this new rule.300 And a concurring judge noted an
“ambiguity in our caselaw[.]”301 Thus, this concurring opinion may have
encouraged a petition for review and explained why the supreme court
granted review to “clarify our prior holdings on this issue.”302
3.

Procedural Issues

The final category of domestic-relations appeals involved procedural
questions. Three of these appeals related to whether the divorce decree was
a final, appealable order. In all three cases, the court of appeals dismissed
the appeal because the decree was not final.303 In each case, the decrees ordered the marital property to be sold on mutually agreeable terms; if the
parties could not agree, then the property would be sold, and the proceeds
divided equally.
The supreme court accepted all three cases on petition for review. But
before the supreme court decided any of these appeals, it decided Davis v.
Davis, which effectively disposed of them all. In Davis, the court of appeals
certified a question to the supreme court about the finality of the divorce

293. Id. at 5, 473 S.W.3d at 11.
294. 2020 Ark. 108, 595 S.W.3d 347.
295. Id. at 9, 473 S.W.3d at 352.
296. Pace v. Pace, 2019 Ark. App. 284, at 13, 578 S.W.3d 284, 292.
297. Pace, 2020 Ark. at 11, 595 S.W.3d at 353.
298. 2017 Ark. 331, at 15, 532 S.W.3d 58, 67.
299. Singletary v. Singletary, 2013 Ark. 506, at 7, 431 S.W.3d 234, 239.
300. Cooper v. Kalkwarf, 2017 Ark. App. 405, at 15, 525 S.W.3d 508, 516.
301. Id. at 16, 525 S.W.3d at 516 (Virden, J., concurring).
302. See Cooper, 2017 Ark. 331, at 13, 532 S.W.3d at 66.
303. E.g., Kelly v. Kelly, 2015 Ark. App. 147, at 3, 2015 WL 1000809, at *1; Moore v.
Moore, 2015 Ark. App. 115, at 2, 2015 WL 801993, at *1; Sherman v. Boeckmann, 2015
Ark. App. 566, at 2, 2015 WL 6269348, at *1.
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decree.304 There, the decree ordered the parties, if they could not otherwise
agree, to sell certain marital property by a commissioner’s sale.305 The supreme court held that this constituted a final order because it “addressed
every issue presented by the parties, reserving no issues to be determined
later.”306 The supreme court also noted that contrary authority from the court
of appeals “misapplie[d] the law on finality.”307 The supreme court remanded Davis for resolution on the merits.308
Davis preordained the outcome in the three finality appeals taken on
petition for review. In Kelly v. Kelly, the supreme court, relying on Davis,
concluded the order was final.309 The supreme court remanded the case for
the court of appeals’ consideration on the merits.310 The supreme court
reached the same decision in Sherman v. Boeckmann.311 Citing Kelly, the
supreme court held the decree constituted a final order and remanded it.312
But Moore v. Moore presented an interesting anomaly. In Moore, the
supreme court again found that the decree had been final.313 But rather than
remanding the case to the court of appeals, the supreme court considered the
merits.314 The supreme court then overruled several cases on the propertydivision statute.315 It explained remanding to the court of appeals without
correcting those erroneous decisions first would “not further efficient administration of justice.”316
The supreme court has accepted other cases on petition for review involving procedural points about the right to a hearing.317 It has also accepted
a petition for review to clarify the requirements of an Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure—Civil.318 The court of appeals declined to reach the merits of certain arguments because the appellant failed to properly designate
304. Davis v. Davis, 2016 Ark. 64, at 3, 487 S.W.3d 803, 805.
305. Id. at 2–3, 487 S.W.3d at 804.
306. Id. at 7, 487 S.W.3d at 807 (internal citations omitted).
307. Id. at 9, 487 S.W.3d at 808 (referencing Wadley v. Wadley, 2010 Ark. App. 733,
2010 WL 4345683).
308. Id., 487 S.W.3d at 808.
309. 2016 Ark. 72, at 3, 483 S.W.3d 296, 297 (citing Davis, 2016 Ark. 64, 487 S.W.3d
803).
310. Id., 483 S.W.3d 296, 297.
311. 2016 Ark. 203, at 2, 2016 WL 2866391, at *1.
312. Id., 2016 WL 2866391, at *1.
313. 2016 Ark. 105, at 3, 486 S.W.3d 766, 770.
314. Id. at 4, 486 S.W.3d at 770.
315. Id. at 8, 486 S.W.3d at 772 (overruling Layman v. Layman, 292 Ark. 539, 731
S.W.2d 771 (1987); Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619 (2006); Brown v.
Brown, 373 Ark. 333, 284 S.W.3d 17 (2008)); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315 (2015).
316. Moore, at 4 n.1, 486 S.W.3d at 770.
317. E.g., Potts v. Potts, 2017 Ark. 33, 512 S.W.3d 611; Hargis v. Hargis, 2019 Ark. 321,
587 S.W.3d 208.
318. Emis v. Emis, 2017 Ark. 52, at 3, 508 S.W.3d 886, 887.
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which order she appealed from.319 The supreme court disagreed by a vote of
6-1.320 The supreme court found the notice of appeal substantially complied
with the appellate rules.321 And like it did in the divorce decree cases above,
the supreme court remanded to the court of appeals for a decision on the
merits.322
V. CONCLUSION
After analyzing the data and researching the cases where the supreme
court granted review, we have reached the following conclusions. First, the
odds the supreme court will grant review are slim. Only 11.92% of the petitions for review we analyzed were granted. Second, the data suggest the
supreme court granted review for consistent reasons. Cases involving a split
decision from court of appeals were granted at the highest rate and by a significantly large margin. Third, probate cases—mostly guardianships and
adoptions—were granted at a higher rate than any other case type. Fourth,
our analysis showed the supreme court granted a high number of petitions
on unresolved questions of appellate procedure like finality. And last, once
the supreme court accepted review, it reached a different result from the
court of appeals in about 55% of the cases.

319.
320.
321.
322.

Emis v. Emis, 2016 Ark. App. 369, at 4, 2016 WL 4541891, at *2.
Emis, 2017 Ark. 52, at 4, 508 S.W.3d at 888.
Id., 508 S.W.3d at 888.
Id., 508 S.W.3d at 888.
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